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“Aprueba usted la propuesta de construcción del tercer juego
de esclusas en el Canal de Panamá?1
— Referendum Question
Introduction
On October 22, 2006, by answering the
above simple question with a “Yes” or “No” vote,
Panamanians made a democratic decision about
an expansion of the Panama Canal that will
determine the future of their country and much
of world trade. Panamanian President Martín
Torrijos described the referendum as “the most
important decision about the canal and its role
in the twenty-first century.” (Torrijos)
Regardless of a 43 percent turnout and contro-
versy about polls and government pro-expan-
sion promotion, the official results confirmed
what previous polls had been predicting; the
“Yes” vote won with an overwhelming 77 per-
cent of the ballots. (Palm) Thorough forecasts
and studies show that the project, which will
add a larger third set of locks, is feasible and will
be profitable; and many economic benefits have
been promised to Panamanians. Nevertheless,
the overwhelming victory does not reflect the
intense national debate that took place, one in
which critics questioned the project’s necessi-
ty and success by identifying its huge risks. 
In this article, I examine in detail the pro-
posed expansion and the national debate. I also
argue why the Panama Canal Authority (ACP2),
the government, and Panamanian citizens
1Spanish for “Do you approve the proposal for the con-
struction of the third set of locks at the Panama Canal?”
2The Autoridad del Canal de Panamá is the autonomus
entity of the Panamanian government that operates and
manages the Panama Canal.
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should keep in mind the issues involved in this
megaproject if they are to achieve the common
goal of assessing, mitigating, and managing the
associated risks. Panamanians have the oppor-
tunity to prove that they are capable of making
the best of their most valuable asset in the
twenty-first century, but to do so they will need
a special effort, un esfuerzo especial.
Background
Canal History3
The canal has been a huge part of
Panama’s past and its development as a nation.
For much of the nation’s history, Panama’s role
in the canal that bears its name had been close
to nonexistent; but since the country gained full
control, a much different history has transpired.
Since the Spanish conquistador Vasco Núñez
de Balboa first crossed the Isthmus of Panama
in 1513, the potential for a trading route
between the world’s largest oceans was evident.
In 1893 a French 13-year-long canal attempt
led by Ferdinand de Lesseps, the chief organiz-
er behind the Suez Canal construction, failed
due to the complexity of building a sea-level
canal and the widespread prevalence of tropical
disease. The United States, prompted by
Theodore Roosevelt’s desire to have a two-ocean
navy, took over the project after facilitating
Panama’s independence from Colombia in
exchange for the right to build the canal and
for control over a 10-mile-wide strip of land
known as the Canal Zone. Recognized as one of
the greatest engineering achievements of all
time, construction was completed in 1914, suc-
cess being attributed to the elimination of trop-
ical disease and a lock-based elevated design. In
1939 the U.S. started the addition of a larger
third set of locks for military reasons. A signif-
icant amount of material was excavated before
the project was interrupted by WWII but was
never completed. After the war, increasing ten-
sions between the U.S. and Panama motivated
by protests from many who believed that the
Canal Zone righteously belonged to Panama led
to the Torrijos-Carter Treaties being signed in
1977, which started the process of handing over
the canal to Panama. On December 31, 1999,
the ACP gained full control even though there
was concern in the U.S. and the shipping indus-
try. The Panamanian constitution thereafter
mandated that any subsequent canal expansion
would require a public referendum vote as canal
ownership was to revert to the Panamanian
people. The ACP’s administration proved every-
one who thought that Panamanians could not
manage the canal wrong, and turned the previ-
ously non-profit operation into a very profitable
business. For more than six years, the ACP has,
in fact, operated the canal efficiently on a debt-
free basis, while bringing in huge profits and
maintaining security and safety standards.
From 2000 to 2005, canal revenues to the gov-
ernment have totaled $2 billion, while also gen-
erating an additional indirect contribution of
approximately $2.7 billion to the national econ-
omy. In 2006 alone the canal brought in $1.4
billion of revenue, its all-time highest.
Reaching Maximum Capacity4
The maximum ship size and daily transit
capacities of the 50-mile transoceanic waterway
are now being reached. In 2006 the then 92-
year-old canal was running at 85 percent of its
maximum sustainable capacity, with approxi-
mately 50 percent of the ships using the canal
of Panamax5 size. Increasingly long waits of four
to five days (Kraul and White) at both canal
entrances is a clear consequence of a boom in
world trade and an obvious sign that an update
is in order. According to the ACP, between 2009
and 2012 the existing canal is expected to reach
its maximum sustainable capacity, which is lim-
ited by the current locks.
Expansion Proposal
On April 24, 2006, after a long period of
speculation, the ACP unveiled details of the 
proposed expansion. The proposal not only
3The following summary of the Panama Canal’s  history
is drawn primarily from McCullough’s The Path between
the Seas, “The Panama Canal,” and La Prensa articles.
4Most details on the expansion project in this and other
sections come from the ACP’s Proposal for the Expansion
of the Panama Canal — Third Set of Locks Project, which
for further reference can easily be accessed online, as well
as can all the ACP studies, at www.pancanal.com.
5Panamax refers to the maximum size ship that can 
currently use the Panama Canal.
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describes the design, but also analyzes the
necessity, feasibility, and economic justification
for the project. The design entails the creation
of a third lane of traffic by the construction of
two new sets of locks at the Atlantic and Pacific
entrances. (See Figure 1 above, numbers 2
and 4.)
Each new lock facility would be composed
of three lock levels or chambers, each 180 feet
wide, 1,400 feet long, and 60 feet deep. Like the
existing smaller locks, the new ones will work
by gravity, thereby not requiring pumps. The
second component of the project is the con-
struction and widening of access channels,
which would, as would the new locks, take
advantage of the 1939 excavations. A third com-
ponent is the deepening of navigation channels
and the elevation of Gatun Lake’s maximum
operating level.6 The projected $5.25 billion
modification would allow for the transit of so-
called post-Panamax ships that exceed the
dimensions of the existing canal. The expected
completion of the expansion by the end of 2014,
the centenary of the canal’s inauguration,
would almost double the canal’s total capacity
by allowing the transit of ships carrying up to
12,000 twenty-foot containers (TEU), 2.5 times
the cargo capacity of a Panamax ship. 
The Debate and Critical Arguments 
The fact that the “No” position received
only 22 percent (Palm) of the referendum votes
is somewhat misleading as it may not reflect
the validity and strength of the arguments pro-
posed by the well-organized opposition. Public
opinion was influenced by a huge expansion 
campaign promoted by the ACP and the gov-
ernment. However, skeptics came up with many
well-thought-out powerful arguments against
the expansion, backing them up with evidence
and demanding clarification and future analy-
sis. Even though critics were not successful in
altering the referendum result, their concerns
must be considered and managed well if the
expansion is to be a success. Not all anti-expan-
sion arguments were well-grounded, emerging
as they did out of an anti-ruling elite opposi-
tion, with the clear political intent of persuad-
Figure 1
Proposed Canal Expansion and Route Map
Source: Edited from www.WorldAtlas.com and Proposal for the Expansion of the Panama Canal, pp. 13–14.
6Also referred to as Lake Gatun, it is the artificial lake
that is a major component of the Panama Canal.
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ing Panamanians to vote against the project.
Nonetheless, the critics did identify a number
of very real potential risks that warrant discus-
sion.
Technological Feasibility and 
Environmental Risk
The ACP’s design appears to make the
expansion technologically feasible and to min-
imize negative environmental effects.
Nevertheless, the opposition has questioned
both the design itself and the associated envi-
ronmental studies, identifying potential risks.
Water supply for operating a larger set of locks
is the main environmental concern, both in
terms of ensuring sufficient availability and in
terms of the potential implications of addition-
al usage. 
The design selected by the ACP would not
require the creation of new reservoirs, which
will minimize environmental and social
impacts. Instead it incorporates three gravity-
operated, water-reutilization basins per lock
chamber, capable of recycling approximately 60
percent of the water. (See Figure 2 below.) This
technology has already been used in similar
locks in Germany. In fact, the proposed locks
would use only 93 percent of the amount of
water the current locks use per transit even
though their volume is 54 percent larger. In
addition, the navigation channels at Gatun Lake
and Gaillard Cut will be deepened by 4 feet, and
the lake’s maximum operating level will be
increased by 1.5 feet, both of which will increase
storage capacity. As a result of the three meth-
ods (water-saving basins, increased lake level,
and deeper channels), water supply will be suf-
ficient to manage 17,700 current equivalent
transits per year; consequently, the ACP does
not envision water availability issues to be a 
factor. 
A major concern for the population, half
of which depends upon drinking water that
comes from the system of lakes that make up
the canal, is that the water-reutilization basins
would cause the intrusion of salt water into the
watershed. The ACP proposal claims that its
studies conclude that water quality will be
maintained at Gatun and Alajuela lakes. ANCON
(National Association for Nature Conservation),
a major environmental organization, agrees
that there will be very low levels of salinization,
which will ensure water quality for human con-
sumption as well as preserve existing biodiver-
sity by maintaining a fresh water environment.
(Arias Loredo and Sucre G.) However, critics
claim that the ACP is manipulating and 
misrepresenting the results of their own stud-
ies. For example, journalist Eric Jackson has
pointed out that the studies conclude that salin-
ity will inevitably increase and that the 
Figure 2
The New Locks Complex
Source: Proposal for the Expansion of the Panama Canal, p. 12.
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suggested mitigation measures are either too
expensive or require flushing the locks with
fresh water, which is counterproductive to the
purpose of the water-saving pools. (Jackson,
“Propaganda…”)
The opposition has also been concerned
about a water supply sufficient to meet demand.
They argue that the potentially negative effects
of El Nino/La Nina and global warming on
water supply were not analyzed and taken into
proper account. (Menendez) Before the official
proposal was released, many Panamanians were
opposed to the expansion because they antici-
pated the construction of new dams, which
would cause the flooding of farmland and pop-
ulated areas and the major alteration of ecosys-
tems. Somewhat ironically, now that a dam-less
project is moving ahead, critics have suggested
that the ACP could consider constructing dams
later on, if water supply is jeopardized or just
because building dams is cheaper than water-
reutilization basins. (“El Canal de la Discordia”;
“10 Grandes Razones…”) 
The planned adoption of viable and proven
technologies suggests that the project,
although challenging, appears both technical-
ly and environmentally feasible with minimal
adverse effects. However, environmental risks
are certainly present and should receive ongo-
ing monitoring.
Opportunity versus Need
Even though it seems obvious that the
canal’s capacity will soon be reached, the “need”
for an expansion has been questioned. Perhaps
independent of the question of need per se, 
the expansion certainly appears to be an 
opportunity. 
The ACP is afraid that deterioration in
service of a canal operating at full capacity
would lead to an irreversible loss of customers
to other routes, enabling them to supplant the
Panamanian one. The ACP especially wants to
secure the containership trade between
Northeast Asia and the U.S. East Coast (here-
after the “focus route”), one of the canal’s
strongest current market segments. This seg-
ment has the highest growth potential but also
faces strong competition. With a 61 percent
market share, the U.S. Intermodal system7 is
currently the principal competitor to the canal’s
focus route market, as it provides shorter times
and the advantage of using post-Panamax ships.
Even though the U.S. Intermodal system is also
approaching its maximum capacity, studies ana-
lyzing the construction of railways connecting
to ports on the west coast of Mexico or Canada
suggest further potential competition.
(Proposal for the Expansion…, p. 23) Most
importantly, the Suez Canal, which can also
accommodate post-Panamax vessels, is antici-
pated to capture most of the growing demand
as the other two major routes reach their max-
imum capacities. Shippers currently operating
on the focus route could increase their pro-
ductivity per vessel by switching from using
Panamax ships through Panama to using post-
Panamax ships through Suez because the dif-
ference in distance is not that significant.
(Proposal for the Expansion…, p. 21)
The opposition has rejected ACP claims
that without the expansion the canal would
become obsolete, arguing that the existing two-
lane canal would continue to bring in profits.
According to Tomas Drohan, the canal’s retired
Director of the Department of Engineering,
Dredging and Construction, the waterway will
keep operating at maximum capacity. He has
further claimed that, despite an inability to cap-
ture additional cargo, short supply of canal
transits would even enable the ACP to raise
prices and increase revenues in the short-term.
(Drohan, Remarks…)
Even though the ACP’s predictions about
what awaits the canal without the expansion
have been questioned, there is clearly an oppor-
tunity. The existing canal will definitely keep
generating profits if it is not expanded, and it is
even feasible to expand the capacity to a certain
extent by making improvements. However,
there is an opportunity to improve the opera-
tional efficiency and productivity of the canal,
but most importantly there is an opportunity
to bring in greater profits by capturing the rev-
enues from a growing market. The ACP expects
the recent growth in international trade caused
by Asian economic booms to continue, with the
7The transpacific route to U.S. West Coast ports (Los
Angeles-Long Beach or Seattle), combined with the U.S. rail
network and highway system.
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volume of global containerized cargo growing
at 5.6 percent annually and the canal’s tonnage
volume increasing at an average annual rate of
3 percent. The ACP also predicts there will be
approximately 670 post-Panamax container-
ships by 2011, accounting for 37 percent of 
containership capacity. An analysis of the 
economics and risks of the project provides a
better understanding of its benefits and set-
backs, as discussed in the next section.
Project Economics and Risks8
Economics will play the most important
role in determining the success of the expan-
sion and its positive impact on Panama’s future.
The ACP has addressed three questions. How
much will the expansion cost? Can the project
be financed? Will the undertaking be profitable
in the long run? 
Project Cost
The published estimate of the total cost,
one major determinant of the project’s finan-
cial feasibility and profitability, has been the tar-
get of much criticism. The ACP’s estimate was
based on a limited conceptual design as well as
experience and information gleaned from sim-
ilar projects and activities. It presumably
includes all the factors that contribute to the
total cost and provides for contingencies and
inflation. (Proposal for the Expansion…, p. 17)
Nevertheless, many argue that the ACP’s $5.25
billion price tag is underestimated and point to
the huge cost overrun risks that megaprojects
generally pose and the implications this would
generate, especially for such a small country. 
The ACP has emphasized that the sound-
ness and reliability of the cost estimate have
been assured by a thorough analysis of the
requirements and components of design and
execution, as well as by the degree of detail in
the estimation of costs and contingencies. On
the other hand, opponents have identified items
that were not clearly included in the estimate,
like the construction of a bridge or tunnel
across the canal in the Atlantic entrance as 
well as a spillway in Gatun. The ACP has yet 
to clarify whether some of these costs were
included within more general categories, or
whether they were ignored either because they
represent government expenditures or because
they are part of an ongoing modernization of
the canal. Also, critics have questioned the
degree of detail, claiming that the ACP only
worked with a 30-percent-complete conceptu-
al design. Drohan has referred to the ACP 
estimate as a “flagrant lowball bid” after com-
paring it with that for a similar 1993 design,
which would now cost $12.5 billion. (Drohan
as quoted by Jackson, “The ‘No’ Campaign…”)
The Panamanian Society of Engineers and
Architects (SPIA) came up with an itemized
estimate of $7 billion in May 2006. While less
than Drohan’s rough estimate, it is still higher
than that of the ACP and could make the 
project unprofitable, according to University of
Panama economics professor Roberto Mendez.
(Mendez as quoted by Jackson, “On the
Campaign…”) 
Critics further argue that the ACP has
underestimated the costs assigned to contin-
gencies that cover risks and unexpected events.
The ACP used a risk analysis model to calculate
an additional $1.03 billion for contingencies
that account for increases in the cost of labor,
equipment, operating supplies, and materials,
as well as possible delays. According to the ACP,
“This contingency level is adequate and suffi-
cient for this type of project in its conceptual
phase of design,” especially because it incorpo-
rates proven activities (dredging, contracting,
managing) and technologies with which it has
extensive experience. (Proposal for the
Expansion…, p. 11) Nevertheless, many dis-
agree with the ACP. According to Drohan, the
project involves the construction of two large
rock dams and huge locks with water-reutiliza-
tion basins, structures that have never been
built by the ACP. He, as well as other critics,
thinks the contingency factor should be high-
er than 28 percent for a megaproject of this
nature, even higher than 50 percent, to ensure
confidence for a final design. (Drohan, “The
True Cost…”)
Even though the ACP was assisted in its
cost estimation procedures by teams of inter-
8Unless otherwise specified, details on the economics of
the project in this and other sections come from the ACP’s
Proposal for the Expansion of the Panama Canal — Third
Set of Locks Project.
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national consultants and construction experts,
the participation of Parsons Brinkerhoff
International has produced skepticism. This
firm is infamous for its involvement in the “Big
Dig” in Boston, a megaproject that ended up
costing almost three times the initial estimate
and still has unresolved technical issues. In
addition, the company has been involved in cor-
ruption scandals and fraudulent acts. Therefore,
its possible future involvement in the con-
struction of the new locks is also a source of
concern to critics like University of Panama
professor Miguel Antonio Bernal. (Bernal) 
In general, the nature of megaprojects dic-
tates that in most ventures actual costs exceed
planned costs, which in turn is often the source
of even more costly legal disputes. According to
the authors of Megaprojects and Risk: An
Anatomy of Ambition, cost overruns occur in
nine out of ten megaprojects, with one of the
major causes being the lack of realism of the
initial estimates. (Flyvbjerg et al., p. 12) Even
after a final estimate is completed in Panama,
either corruption (in the form of negociados9
during the bidding process or unwarranted
high salaries) or higher-than-expected contin-
gency costs could lead to overruns. These con-
cerns, combined with the ones discussed in the
next section, illustrate the potential risks of this
megaproject.
Profitability, Financing, and Risk
The ACP proposal implies that the project
is a sound investment, describing it as highly
profitable, self-financing, and entailing 
manageable risks. The ACP has estimated the 
project’s most probable internal rate of return
to be approximately 12 percent. The investment
would be financed mainly by the increase in 
revenues from a combination of a 3 percent
average annual growth in traffic volume and a
3.5 percent average annual increase in tolls,
along with interim external financing.
(Proposal for the Expansion…, p. 71) The 
ACP projects an initial investment payback 
period of less than ten years, a reasonable time
in its view. (Proposal for the Expansion…, 
p. 21) Opponents, however, believe that ACP
revenue projections are based on overly-sim-
plistic assumptions about uncertain future
events and that these may jeopardize the 
project’s financing and profitability, thereby
making the risks enormous. The former canal
administrator Fernando Manfredo claims that
the success of the expansion is based on unre-
alistic and uncertain projections about both
maritime trade and the world economy.
(“Panama President to…”) Others, such as
Roberto Mendez, think it is unreasonable to
expect that U.S. imports from China will con-
tinue to grow as quickly as they recently have
over the next twenty years. (Jackson, “On the
Campaign…”) Critics view the current U.S.-
China trade imbalance as unsustainable and
hence predict it will be adjusted, while ACP
forecasts assume that this imbalance will keep
increasing. 
The ACP claims that the canal will remain
competitive, even in the face of higher tolls, as
it expects users to pay reasonable increases if
their operation costs decrease by virtue of their
new ability to utilize larger containerships. A
planned toll policy focused on price differenti-
ation by vessel size and cargo type will capture
the value of the canal to each market segment.
(“Proposal to Modify…”) Post-Panamax con-
tainerships provide economies of scale that
reduce the operational costs per container.
Besides, the Panama Canal has some advan-
tages over its competition. Compared to the
Suez Canal route, Panama is more convenient
for the Northeast Asia-U.S. East Coast route
given the same vessel capacity. It has a com-
parative advantage of 23 percent savings in total
transportation cost per container (Proposal for
the Expansion…, p. 30), and shorter times give
shippers the opportunity to use fewer ships,
providing them with a higher return on invest-
ment. (Proposal for the Expansion…, p. 28) 
On the other hand, the U.S. Intermodal system
faces higher and growing costs and lower 
reliability due to near-capacity congestion, and
there are also political obstacles to further
growth. (Proposal for the Expansion…, p. 28;
“Panama Canal Expansion…”)
9Negociado refers to an illicit or unethical agreement in
which contracts are won with bribes or because of person-
al relationships. In this case, it has been suggested that con-
tractors could bribe ACP officials to win bids.
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In contrast, critics believe that the ACP is
irresponsibly assuming that the maritime
industry is willing to pay toll increases of any
magnitude and is ignoring their ability to use
other routes. The major threat is that the Suez
Canal, which can already accommodate post-
Panamax containerships, could capture the
growing Northeast Asia-U.S. East Coast trade
since Suez’s current financial security gives it
the flexibility to lower its tolls. (Drohan, “What
the ‘Yes’…”) Opponents’ fears became a reality
in April 2007 when Suez announced discounts
for shippers on the focus route at the time that
Panama announced a toll increase of 33 percent
for containerships over the next three years.
(Muñoz) Furthermore, the U.S. Intermodal sys-
tem is also a strong competitor since it offers
shorter times; and even though the ACP claims
the system has obstacles to further growth, crit-
ics are still concerned about the possibility of
future expansion. (Mendez) 
Finally, critics have disputed the reliabil-
ity of the overall self-financing argument and
are afraid of the financial risks. To face the peak
construction period (2009 to 2011), the project
requires approximately $2.3 billion in external
financing, which would be easily obtained by
the ACP, according to international investment
firms such as Bear Stearns. (Berrocal R.)
However, external financing is risky because the
estimate is almost half the investment, and its
true value is uncertain and variable. Besides, a
detailed financing plan has not yet been devel-
oped. Toll increases could potentially cause a
loss of Panamax vessels that do not need or can-
not afford a size upgrade. If a significant loss of
the most valuable current customers occurs
before construction is completed or before the
investment is recovered, huge financing risks
suddenly loom. (Reynolds; Drohan, “What the
‘Yes’…”) What if the repayment of loans is jeop-
ardized? What if lack of funding delays or pre-
vents the completion of the project?
Impact and Risk
ACP projections for the expansion include
huge economic benefits to Panama. An invest-
ment of this magnitude would boost the nation-
al economy due to the multiplier effect, as other
economic activities that revolve around the
canal, such as port activity and the Colón Free
Trade Zone, would grow as well. According to
the ACP, Panamanian GDP in 2025 would be 2.5
times the 2005 levels, an annual rate of increase
of approximately 5 percent (1.2 percentage
points higher than the rate without the expan-
sion). A major economic benefit of special inter-
est to Panamanians is the creation of new jobs.
The ACP has estimated that 6,750 jobs would
be created during the execution of the project,
while the number of permanent jobs created as
a direct and indirect result of the expansion
would be between 150,000 and 250,000 by 2025.
However, many consider these job estimates
exaggerated and criticize the lack of an accom-
panying social development plan. 
The proposal clearly stated that payments
to the National Treasury from canal operation
during the project’s execution would not be less
than those in FY 2006 ($489 million). These
contributions would increase once the third set
of locks begins operating, tripling by 2015 and
rising to eight times the FY 2005 level in 2025.
The proposal also makes it clear that the 
project would not entail state endorsement or
guarantees for the required loans. Indeed,
Panamanian law does not allow government
involvement in the canal’s finances. However,
since the ACP is a government agency, does this
not mean that public debt would dangerously
increase? (de la Guardia) In addition, it appears
almost inevitable that if anything goes wrong
financially as the expansion moves on, those
payments to the government’s general fund,
which are essential to cover the fiscal expenses
planned in the upcoming years, would decrease.
What if the state does not receive the treasury
contributions? Would the government provide
funding to the ACP to pay off debts? These and
other risks will have to be mitigated and man-
aged, as discussed in the next section.
Moving Forward — Next Steps
Engineering economy and technology
decisions are yes-no decisions, but end results
depend on the details of how a process is car-
ried out. The ACP did its job by funding approx-
imately 120 studies, totaling some 55,000
pages, costing $30 million, and resulting in
well-reasoned predictions and analyses from
renowned firms. The executive and legislative
branches of the government both approved the
83
ACP proposal, providing the technical design
and a solid economic justification, and the 
project received a green flag via the referen-
dum. Nonetheless, the ACP still needs to rec-
ognize that its predictions might not prove to
be 100 percent accurate due to potential mis-
calculations and inherent uncertainty and risks,
as identified by the opposition and discussed in
previous sections. As a result, it will be impor-
tant to monitor the project for significant
changes and continue to receive legal, risk, and
financial assistance from specialized firms. A
poll conducted in June 2006 indicates that 50
percent of Panamanians do not feel they can
trust the ACP’s integrity and transparency dur-
ing the expansion process. (Perez) To be suc-
cessful, therefore, the ACP and Panamanians
must maintain careful control to minimize
deviations from the plan and prevent any taint
of corruption. The ACP should have the ability
to adapt to changes while making sure most
promises are kept, but it should also have the
determination to abort the project if necessary.
In particular, the ACP must seek to mitigate and
manage risks in terms of design considerations,
cost overruns, and revenue projections. 
The risks that come from design consid-
erations need to be mitigated because they
could be the source of larger environmental and
economic risks. Since the studies are not clear
about what water salinity levels are acceptable,
nor do they propose a plan to constantly mon-
itor these levels, the ACP and environmental
organizations have a responsibility to ensure
that more studies are conducted. Promptly pre-
dicting whether providing adequate water sup-
ply would require the ACP to build reservoir
dams or plan salinity mitigation measures
would also be crucial. Any design alterations
must be managed carefully because they could
affect costs and revenues significantly. In addi-
tion, extensive design alterations would theo-
retically require a new referendum. Therefore,
the ACP will need to minimize modifications
while Panamanians should understand that
some design changes might be necessary. 
Similarly, the ACP must mitigate cost
overrun risks caused either by inaccurate ini-
tial estimates or by flaws in the project’s 
execution. The ACP should update the cost 
estimates of components and contingencies
before the main bidding process starts in order
to determine a revised estimate for a complete
final design. Special focus should be directed to
the new locks and water saving basins, which
represent roughly 70 percent of the total cost.
This estimate will be useful for comparing with
the documented bids of construction firms that
will be based on their own detailed designs and
cost estimates. The ACP can then take a more
proactive role in the negotiations with con-
struction firms, perhaps allowing them to
increase their expected profit in exchange for
bearing some of the responsibility for overruns.
If the final cost estimates reveal the project
would be either unprofitable or not sufficient-
ly profitable compared to the risk, the ACP
could consider an alternate design by changing
the technical characteristics. If the expansion
moves ahead, a careful analysis prior to grant-
ing the contracts could be complemented by
the creation of a strong legal framework in
which provisions for overruns have been previ-
ously established in detail. The ACP must also
strictly control and supervise both the bid selec-
tion and construction processes, while 
promoting transparency at all levels to avoid
corruption. If confronted with the possibility of
overruns, the ACP could try to find the sources
and devise ways to renegotiate costs. 
Finally, the ACP must seek to mitigate 
revenue risks caused by demand growth pro-
jections not materializing or by toll increases
that shift trade to competing routes. Since
these risks depend to some extent on exogenous
factors such as the world economy and alter-
native route competition, the ACP should con-
stantly update its projections and analyses,
while also comparing them to studies made in
other countries. Initially, additional studies
about the competition should be conducted,
focusing on the U.S. Intermodal system’s
growth potential and the Suez Canal’s ability to
lower tolls to capture the focus market.
Although the maritime industry has been gen-
erally supportive of the expansion plan, the key
factor will be the effective implementation of
toll increase policies so as not to drive cus-
tomers away. Ongoing consultation with the
maritime industry, which has already shown
signs of grumbling, regarding its willingness to




Proudly managing the canal since 2000,
Panamanians now have sole responsibility for
their greatest asset. They want to expand it
efficiently and to prosperous ends, and to do
so by themselves, as owners and managers of
their own destiny. If they are to be successful,
however, it will be necessary to proceed with
precision, foresight, and caution.
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